Commission Fever

Aside from true beltway insiders, it\'s hard to think of many citizens who could recognize (much less specifically name) the dozens of past and present commissions which have been impaneled in this country. As if the current crop didn\'t suffice, Congress has appointed a substantial quantity of its own in-house \"select committees\" -- often to analyze the same problems already delegated to presidentially assigned bodies. Not surprisingly, these subcommittees frequently break down along party lines and have their own predetermined agendas. Thus, the conclusions they reach are predicated upon which political party controls the majority of members.

Added to these \"select\" congressional groups are the supernumerary executive delegations, such as the five-star Warren Commission (which studied the Kennedy assassination), and the present-day 9/11 Commission. This accumulation of brainpower and experience is recruited in particular to address vital issues of national importance.

Other less publicized committees (both from within and outside of government) co-exist with their pre-eminent counterparts, and delve into what \"the powers that be\" consider \"manageable\" and not quite so urgent. Among the numerous but less-than-critical subjects being reviewed at the moment are the \"outing\" of former Ambassador Joseph Wilson\'s CIA-agent wife (by the Department of Justice); the Oil for Food scandal (by a congressional committee as well as the U.N. and other international agencies); and an intensive exploration into the disappearance of WMD (by just about everybody).

Commissions cost tons of taxpayer dollars and the output of their work is never without debate and/or controversy. Aside from their exorbitant expense, they share several features. First, they take forever to install, and no matter how impressive the membership, there are inevitably complaints about the makeup of the panel. In truth, no one who has any affiliation with Washington politics is without conflict of interest, and often the bottom line comes down to whose ox is being gored.

Then, it\'s too often the case that these commissions end up telling us what we already know - or at least think we know. They either bolster the convictions of one side or confirm the opposing side\'s belief that everything is somehow rigged and the truth has been overlooked or concealed. Finally, these extensive, well-researched reports either get totally ignored or are put away somewhere only to be retrieved when another similar project is contemplated or in the works. Perhaps the conclusions and suggestions for change are skimmed by a few politicians and reporters but ultimately they\'re relegated to someone\'s bottom drawer.

There are circumstances for which we need a thorough, impartial investigation of the causes and effects of weighty national problems. Ideally, that should be the function of carefully appointed and well-run commissions. Yet even when we have such resources in play and the results are laudable and on the mark -- such as the prescient U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, headed by Warren Rudman and Gary Hart -- some official must first read and absorb the advice and recommendations of the group seriously, then act upon them when it seems prudent. There must be two parts to the process for it to work effectively.

The Hart-Rudman Commission on National Security presented a report to the Bush administration on Jan. 31, 2001. Among the observations stated was the warning: \"We are going to get hit in the domestic United States and we are going to get hit big. That\'s No. 1. And No. 2, we have big systemic problems. The F.B.I. doesn\'t work the way it should and it doesn\'t communicate with the intelligence communities.\" And because some congressmen took the advice to heart, legislation was introduced in the spring of 2001 to create a homeland security agency. Before hearings could be held, however, President Bush intervened and asked that Congress not act until Vice President Cheney could look into the matter of terrorism and security. As we know now, there was no vice presidential or presidential action on this matter until after September 11.

Americans need to differentiate between necessary and gratuitous probes, and insist that officials form commissions and committees only when no reasonable alternative can be found. They are unbelievably expensive and frequently inconclusive and, when they are studied at all, often cause more problems than they solve. Yet these bodies can be successful, as evidenced by the Hart-Rudman Commission, which accurately identified weaknesses and deficiencies and then set out a framework for change.

On issues as critical as terrorism, we need serious debate, questions answered, concerns addressed and fears assuaged. The 9/11 Commission has been established to meet all those needs. We must hold their feet to the fire, demand impartiality as well as accountability, be prepared to digest its findings and insist that those in authority do the same. This is one commission report that better not end up being ignored.